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ABSTRACT: We argue that value-based dissent from scientific consensus need not be irrational, as is often 
supposed. Instead it may commonly be a rational response to information which, if accepted, induces a conflict in 
core values. We briefly survey normative theories of rationality, drawing specific attention to the role values play 
in those theories. We then characterize the conditions under which it is rational simply to reject the contextual 
facts generating conflict among values. We close with some observations about the values to which science 
communicators may effectively appeal without relinquishing scientific authority. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we briefly survey the relation between values, evidence and rational belief 
revision. Though incomplete, even a brief survey warrants some conclusions, among them this: 
what counts as evidence, and what counts as rational inference from the evidence, depend 
essentially on prior value commitments. That conclusion, in turn, has implications for science 
communication. First, it illuminates the basic logic of the role of values in science 
communication. Second, even scientists and journalists who recognize the importance of 
values in effective communication often frame that importance by appeal to the ‘irrational’ 
aspects of ‘science denial.’ But in fact there need be nothing irrational about such dissent when 
the relevant science induces a conflict between sufficiently important values. Finally, as a 
consequence, such values should not be used to frame science communication. 
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2. REASON: A SHORT HISTORY 
Philosophy has always been intimately concerned with rationality. There are roughly three 
kinds of theory about good reasoning in philosophy: theories of logic, theories of scientific 
method, and theories of rational choice. Values play an ineliminable role in all three kinds of 
theories. Unfortunately, the role of values in logic and in theories of scientific method is often 
obscured. To uncover the way in which values inform both logic and science, it will be useful 
to attend to their more explicit role in Rational Choice Theory. 
2.1 Values in Rational Choice 
Values matter in rational choice theory twice over. A theory of rational choice is, nominally, a 
theory about which actions are rational and which are not.1 To reach such a determination a 
rational choice theory must stipulate a decision rule—a rule for determining of each possible 
action whether it is or is not rational. Examples include such rules as maximin—the rational 
action is the one with the best worst possible payoff, maximax—the rational action is the action 
with the best best possible payoff, and maximize expected utility—the rational action is the 
action which has the highest expected utility. But any application of such a decision rule 
requires input; loosely, part of that input must be a set of valuations for each action. The 
valuations arise as a function of the utility of the outcomes each action makes possible. The 
utility of the outcomes is in turn derived from a preference ordering over all possible outcomes. 
This preference ordering is an expression of the values of the agent whose actions are to be 
modeled. Because utilities express values—preferences, desires, aims—their role in rational 
choice theory is both explicit and ineliminable. 
 But values enter in a second way too, namely in the choice of decision rule. So, for 
example, in some contexts (decision under uncertainty with no dominant strategy), it may 
intuitively make sense to maximin or to maximax, depending on how risk-averse the decision 
maker is. If some actions have possible outcomes that are regarded as entirely unacceptable, 
while on other actions those unacceptable outcomes are impossible, it may make sense to play 
it safe, i.e., to avoid risk by using the maximin decision procedure. This is essentially the idea 
behind the so-called ‘precautionary principle’ (see, e.g., O’Riordan & Cameron, 1994). On the 
other hand, suppose in a particular decision context, no action can produce outcomes that are 
truly disastrous, but all of the actions that produce the very best possible outcomes also risk the 
worst outcomes. In such contexts, it may intuitively make sense to maximax—to risk a 
(relatively) bad result in order to have a chance at getting the overall best possible result. As it 
turns out, there is no theory of rationality that can decide when and where one should be risk 
averse (i.e., choose using maximin reasoning) or risk seeking (i.e., choose using maximax 
reasoning) for decisions under ignorance (i.e., when the probabilities of each outcome 
conditional on taking a given action are not known) (Luce, 1959/2005). 
 The choice between risk-aversion and risk-tolerance, between pessimism and 
optimism, is a choice of values, and as such theories of rational action cannot be brought to 
bear on it; rather, theories of rational action require such choices as input. Said another way: it 
only makes sense to talk about the rationality of an action relative to a whole host of prior 
                                                
1 Within the decision theoretic framework, decisions about what to believe are themselves actions (see e.g.,, 
Levi, 1991). 
REASON, VALUES AND EVIDENCE 
143 
decisions concerning what one cares about—without knowing what your aim in acting is, how 
you value different outcomes, and how much risk you are willing to bear, one cannot say very 
much of anything about the rationality, or irrationality, of your actions. As a philosophic 
aphorism: values are prior to rationality. 
2.2 Values in Logic 
Curiously, values matter essentially in logic as well. To see why, a little bit of logical 
terminology is useful. A logical theory is a theory about what inferences are and are not 
‘valid,’ i.e., to be countenanced as good. Generally the standard for goodness in logic is ‘truth 
preserving’: a logical theory should count as valid only arguments such that if their premises 
are in fact true, it is not possible that their conclusions should be false. In order to classify 
arguments as valid or invalid, logical theories have to be formalized. Technically, then, a 
theory or system of logic is a triple of things: a formal language, a model theory or semantics 
for the language, and a proof theory, or set of rules (inference rules and axioms) defining what 
does and does not count as a valid (i.e., good) inference in the logic.  
 Because there are lots of possible languages, semantics and proof theories, there are 
lots of different logics. A standard first course in logic introduces students to two theories in 
logic, namely Propositional Logic and Predicate (or Quantifier) logic. As it turns out, 
Propositional Logic can be embedded in Predicate logic; consequently it is not necessarily 
obvious that the theories are really all that different. But these two theories do not exhaust the 
logics that have been developed, championed, and put to good use by logicians, philosophers, 
computer scientists and mathematicians. 
 So for example, Propositional and Predicate logics cannot be used to express modal 
claims—claims about what is possible and/or necessary. If one wants to know which 
inferences about possibilities and necessities are valid, one requires a Modal Logic. For 
example, inferences from the fact that one person has a right, say a property right to a 
manuscript, to the fact that some other person is thereby obliged not to act in particular ways, 
e.g.,, not to copy the manuscript without permission, can be shown valid only using a Modal 
Logic. There are many Modal Logics, and they are not simply extensions of one another. For 
example, two famous modal logics are the systems D and S5; each is useful but they are not 
compatible. And in fact the variety of modal logics are but a tithe of the available logics, each 
useful for its own purposes, but not for others.   
 The implication is straightforward. There are lots of logics that have, provably, the 
qualities desired of a logic (they are complete, sound and consistent), but which are not 
reconcilable—they differ about which arguments are and which are not rational inferences. 
Many of them are useful—for some chores Predicate Logic is a good choice; for others a 
Modal Logic such as D, for yet others S5, and for yet others an intuitionistic logic, a quantum 
logic, a fuzzy logic, or some even more esoteric logic is required. No one logic is ‘right,’ so far 
as we know—while each logic defines how to judge ‘good reasoning’ within the logic, such 
standards apply only after one has chosen the logic, and no logic determines standards for how 
to choose which of those logics to adopt in the first place. Instead, the choice between 
alternative logics is a matter of pragmatics—it depends on what you want to do with the logic; 
i.e., it depends on prior commitments about what you value. Again, values are prior to reason. 
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2.3 Values in ‘the’ Scientific Method 
Empirical inferences, inferences from data to theory in science, are also grounded in values in 
much the same way that a choice among logics or decision rules are grounded in values. So for 
example the statistical methods that it makes sense to use when building a model of some 
phenomenon—population size in a managed species, the influence of television on aggressive 
behavior, the causes of recessions, or what have you—depend on the way in which the model 
will be used. One might simply want an efficient representation of the data, and in this case it 
might make sense to use factor analysis or regression methods to construct the model. 
Differently, one might want to use a model to predict what will happen in an undisturbed 
system. In this case maximal likelihood methods such as AIC inference recommend 
themselves. Neither sort of method is particularly good at recovering causal dependencies, 
however, and so if one wants to use the model to choose policies that will control some 
outcome—population size, aggression, or the unemployment rate—yet other methods are 
required (Pearl, 2000; Spirtes, Glymour & Scheines, 2000). Inference methods are claims 
about reasoned belief formation, and so again values are prior to reason.  
 But there is another way in which scientific inferences are grounded in values. 
Science is aimed to produce various useful products, the most central of which are theories. 
Theories can be understood in a variety of ways, but whatever else it may be, a scientific 
theory is a story about how the world works. Some of us, scientists and consumers of science 
alike, demand truth of theories because theories sustain scientific explanations, and we are 
interested in finding true explanations of patterns in the observable world. For like-minded 
scientists and their consumers, the one overriding aim of science is the reliable discovery of 
true theories from observations of the natural world. Note that this aim, like any other, is a 
value commitment in disguise—to adopt an aim is to do endorse certain sacrifices as warranted 
by the goal, i.e., as costs worth bearing in order to achieve the aim. To adopt an aim as 
overriding is to endorse all possible sacrifices as costs worth bearing to achieve the aim. 
 Science is not the only human endeavor to produce stories about how the world 
works, but science claims for itself a special place. The familiar justification for this privileged 
status is that the methods of science are the most reliable methods for producing true stories 
about the machinery that generates observable phenomena. This reliability is in turn justified 
on the ground that science, uniquely, tests its theories against empirical observation. That is 
true, but also incomplete. The basic problem is that the number of alternative theories that 
might possibly account for any domain of phenomena (e.g., motion or heat or adaptation) is 
literally infinite. Assuming that at most one of these theories is true, science cannot hope to 
discover this true theory if it proceeds by testing theories one by one. A better image is that of 
a filter or sieve: scientists use empirical tests to filter infinitely large classes of theories, 
winnowing good theories from bad and retaining only the contenders that are consistent with 
the available data. Typically, these remaining contenders will disagree about many 
fundamental things. But often enough they agree about a subset of claims. What we learn from 
the data using scientific methods are those claims on which all surviving theories agree. 
 The filtering process requires more than just data and alternative theories. 
Philosophers of science call these extra ingredients ‘auxiliary hypotheses.’ There are broadly 
two kinds of auxiliary. One type of auxiliary is used to connect theory to data in the following 
way. The theory will say that under certain conditions (e.g., that a particular trait is a heritable 
cause of survival and reproductive success) a certain outcome (an increase in the frequency of 
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that trait) is to be expected. But generally one cannot directly observe whether or not the 
specified conditions are satisfied (e.g., whether a trait is heritable or whether it causes 
reproductive success); instead, in any particular study one must assume that the conditions are 
satisfied. Often these assumptions are themselves testable, using different data and yet further 
auxiliary assumptions. But not always: there are some auxiliaries that cannot be tested. These 
auxiliaries are instead justified pragmatically. 
 To see the pattern and force of a pragmatic justification, consider Glymour’s youngest 
son Johannes, who is bent on becoming a world-class soccer player. From one perspective, 
Johannes has chosen an unwise career goal. The odds against him are long, and in any serious 
attempt to succeed he will likely compromise his abilities to pursue other, more easily 
achieved, goals. Johannes, however, is willfully blind to the long odds he faces: he simply 
refuses to recognize that it might be impossible for him to become a professional soccer player.  
 Curiously, he is in so doing behaving in a completely rational way. For whatever 
chance he has, that chance depends essentially on lots and lots of practice playing soccer. And 
it would be psychologically impossible for him to devote the necessary time and effort to 
practice if he believed he had no chance of success. Whatever the truth about his chances now, 
Johannes would be doomed to failure if he took seriously the fact that he almost certainly 
doesn’t have the genetic endowment for a career as a professional athlete. Given that soccer is 
Johannes’ heart’s desire, his overriding aim, it is perfectly rational for him to ignore the facts, 
and proceed to practice. 
 Such pragmatic justifications are important, because they are the only kind of 
justification that can be given for a second class of auxiliary assumption. These assumptions 
are needed because among the infinity of alternative theories through which a scientist must 
sort, there are some that are ‘sticky.’ If one puts them into the scientific sieve, they turn out to 
be untestable. And what is very much worse, they make it impossible to test any other theory 
as well. These theories gum up the works.  
 If the central, most fundamental aim of science is reliable discovery of true theories 
from observational data, then there is a pragmatic justification for ruling out such sticky 
hypotheses, more commonly known as ‘skeptical hypotheses.’ The most well known of the 
anti-skeptical auxiliaries is ‘methodological naturalism.’ Methodological naturalism rules out, 
from the very beginning, any theory about the machinery producing observed patterns that 
appeals to supernatural causes. The assumption is made for the very good reason that if it is not 
made, one cannot learn from the data. This is because any theory can be made consistent with 
any pattern in the data, provided one assumes an auxiliary appealing to the local action of a 
non-natural cause (e.g., the interventions of supernatural beings). If we do not rule out such 
alternatives from the very beginning, if we allow appeal to supernatural causes, every theory 
can be made consistent with any data whatsoever, and it becomes impossible to learn from the 
data. Importantly, this is true even if the skeptical hypotheses are in fact false—they do not 
have to be true to gum up the works. Just as Johannes’ only hope of becoming a pro soccer 
player depends both on his actually having enough talent and on his assuming that he does 
(because only then will he practice enough to develop that talent), our only hope for reliable 
discovery in any given domain of observation is that first, no supernatural causes influence the 
observations, and second, that we assume this is true (because only given that assumption will 
our sieve work). So if reliable discovery of the truth from observational data is our overriding 
aim, then methodological naturalism is justified, but only by appeal to that overriding value. 
Again, values are prior to reason. 
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 What does it mean to say that discovery is an overriding value? In the context of 
scientific inference, we can specify that priority quite precisely. First, this value determines 
which claims stand in need of evidential, empirical, warrant, and which do not. Second, this 
value determines which inferential methods are applicable and which are not. Third, because 
different methods will countenance different subsets of the data as evidence, this value 
determines which data are and which are not evidence. And finally, because different methods 
applied to different evidence will yield different conclusions, this value determines which 
conclusions, which beliefs about how the world works, are and are not rational (cf. Kitcher, 
1995). 
 Science yields explanatory stories about how the world works, about which human 
activities are changing the climate or causing extinctions and so on, because science can tell us 
the truth about what is happening, why it is happening and the likely consequences of various 
changes in social behavior. But rational belief in what science says depends on accepting the 
reliable discovery of the truth as an essential aim. There is a corollary: to the extent that we 
value something, anything, more than we value reliable discovery of the truth, it may be 
perfectly rational to reject scientific truths. (cf. Quine, 1951) In effect, this is what Johannes 
does when he persists in his beliefs about his future as a professional soccer player. And he is 
not irrational in such persistence. This sort of rational justification of science denial is available 
more broadly, but to see why we need a more careful discussion of theories of value. 
3. THEORIES OF VALUE 
As a working hypothesis, stipulate that for each one of us there is at each time a set of facts 
about what we care about—the outcomes such that we think, all else being equal, it would be 
good if they occurred, and the sacrifices we would be willing to make to secure those 
outcomes. A descriptive theory of the values held by a person at a time is a systematic 
description of those facts. In the worst case, such a theory is no more than a long conjunction 
of such facts: Boris would prefer better public health and more single malt, he is willing to pay 
higher taxes, even on single malt, to secure the first aim, and is willing to pay up to but not 
more than his disposable income for a bottle of single malt to secure the second aim, and so on. 
But potentially there are simpler descriptions in terms of principles that systematize those 
facts: Boris prefers better public health to single malt, and single malt to dollars. 
Unfortunately, the multiplicity of things we care about—public health, single malt, and dollars, 
but also world peace and eliminating poverty and saving endangered species and so on—raises 
a problem in systematizing any description of what we care about. In particular, the relative 
priority of these many aims is often problematic. 
 There are three ways in which a pair of values may be related to one another. One 
possibility is that the values are subject to some common measure, i.e., are commensurable, 
and hence an exact trade-off can be specified. If Boris is willing to pay as much as but no more 
than $8 for a six-pack of pale ale and $100 for a bottle of single malt, then he prefer bottles of 
single malt to six-packs of pale ale by roughly a factor of 12.5. A second possibility is that one 
value might be incommensurable with another—in effect Boris values public health infinitely 
more than single malt, because he’d be willing to give up any amount of single malt to secure 
better public health. Philosophers speak here of a lexical preference for the first good. Were all 
goods or all goods but one commensurable, we would be on safe ground. But sometimes more 
than one good is incommensurable with a third. Boris may care infinitely more about world 
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peace and public health than about single malt and so have lexical preferences for fewer wars 
and for lower rates of infant mortality over increases in the single malt supply. But how many 
wars will Boris countenance to secure a 20% decrease in infant mortality rates? Here there may 
be no clear answer. And that is the third way in which values may be prioritized—we may 
simply not have ranked them against one another, so that their relative priority is, for us, 
undetermined. 
 Values with undetermined priority are familiar ground in ethics, as they provide the 
stuff of moral tragedy: Is it more important to obey a just law or to honor your family? Is it 
more important to save lives or not to kill? If one’s value commitments are sufficiently clear 
cut that each of the values one cares about is ranked, either by degree on some common 
measure or by lexical preference, then these values will not conflict with one another in any 
circumstance. Those so fortunate as to have completely worked out and prioritized values are 
said by ethicists to be in ‘reflective equilibrium’ (Rawls, 1971). But most of us are not in 
reflective equilibrium—do you have a clear answer to Sophie’s choice, to Antigone’s dilemma, 
or to trolley cases in which one must kill some to save many? If not, if you find it difficult to 
resolve such moral dilemmas, then you are not in reflective equilibrium. 
 Reflective equilibrium is rare because humans are inordinately good at adopting some 
values in one domain, and quite other values in different domains, and simply hoping that the 
domains never overlap in ways that induce conflict. Of course conflicts often do arise, and this 
is what underpins the possibility of moral tragedy. When such conflicts appear, one solution is 
to actually prioritize (or reprioritize) the values one has. But this is psychologically quite 
difficult—which really is more important, the obligation not to kill or the obligation to save 
lives? If the answer is context dependent, as it must be if sometimes killing is better and 
sometimes failing to save lives is better, then in which contexts does each value take 
precedence, and why? It is much, much easier to simply deny that the values conflict. Just so, 
the initial response of students in introductory ethics classes to any hard case of moral tragedy 
is, quite commonly, to look for a course of action that realizes, or anyway respects, both 
values—is there really no other way to save the 5 railway workers except to throw the fat man 
onto the tracks, derailing the trolley? Preserving the values in this way turns on denying the 
conflict between them, which in turn depends on finding an ‘out,’ i.e., changing or expanding 
the specified facts so that some available action will respect both of the nominally conflicting 
values. 
 The need to find an out will be especially pressing in certain circumstances. If the 
relative priority of two values has not been resolved, we may hold a third value, namely 
holding both the first two values without actually prioritizing them. Let us call such a third 
value, i.e., a desire either to avoid prioritizing two other values or to leave their relative priority 
undetermined, an equal-importance commitment. Resolving a conflict between the two initial 
values, say between not killing and saving lives, often requires that we either reject an equal-
importance commitment, or reject as illusory the apparent conflict. When one gives the equal-
importance commitment a priority at least as high as that of the conflicting values, the second 
option will be preferable. This is one way of explaining the fact that many of us are willing to 
devote a good deal of cognitive labor to finding outs when confronted by a moral dilemma. If 
one can respect the dead without violating the laws, then the conflict is resolved by showing 
that the initial specification of the context was false, and the equal-importance commitment is 
thereby preserved. Importantly, this way of resolving a conflict between values is just a way of 
denying the (purported) facts about the context in which the conflict arises. 
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 Suppose now that one prioritizes three values over truth: two values that in fact 
conflict, and a third equal-importance value with respect to them. That is, one cares more about 
holding onto those two core values, as currently unprioritized, than about believing the truth, 
e.g., about the specific context in which those values are supposed to conflict. In such 
circumstances some versions of rational choice cannot be applied, and on them we simply have 
no grounds on which to judge irrational a decision to reject the facts. Other versions of rational 
choice theory, arguably, can be applied and yield the result that the rational choice is to reject 
the facts, to simply deny that the circumstances in which the first two values conflict is actual. 
On those views of rational choice, science denial is sometimes plainly and fully rational. 
4. VALUES, INFERENCE AND RATIONAL DISSENT 
Scientists and science journalists have recently begun to be more aware of the importance of 
values in science communication. If nothing else, there is growing awareness of various 
‘cognitive biases’ such as confirmation bias, assimilation bias and attitude polarization. Even 
so, it is still common for scientists and journalists to see the operation of such biases as species 
of irrationality (see, for example, vanden Huevel, 2011; Giberson & Stephens, 2011; 
Borthwick, 2011). To the extent that science denial is regarded as essentially irrational, the 
point of appealing to values in science communication will be to remediate this irrationality. 
But if we are right, this is to mistake the very nature of the beast. Science denial is not (or 
anyway need not be) irrational—it can arise from equally prioritized, fundamentally important 
values that are brought into conflict by the scientific facts. If those values are more important 
than truth itself, then the rational response in such cases is simply to reject the facts.  
 By way of illustration, there are various conditions under which it will be rational to 
actively reject Evolutionary Theory (ET) as false. The obvious, and least interesting, case is 
that of literalism about the collection of writings known as the ‘Old Testament.’ If one’s 
highest, most central, aim is preserve in oneself a belief that those writings are literally true in 
every respect, then it will be perfectly rational to reject ET, and indeed a great deal of the rest 
of science. Just as Johannes is justified in rejecting the facts in order to pursue his most central 
aim of becoming a soccer player, so too a literalist is justified in rejecting ET. In general, 
rejection of ET is rational if two conditions are satisfied. First, acceptance of ET must be 
incompatible with particular aims which one privileges above that of discovering true theories. 
And second, those aims must take precedence over all other aims, success with respect to 
which would require believing (or anyway using) the true theory about the origin of 
biodiversity. If the first condition is not satisfied, one has no reason to reject ET. If the second 
condition is not satisfied, one has reason to reject ET, but this reason is outweighed, 
overridden, by even more powerful reasons to accept ET. But if both conditions are satisfied, it 
is rational to reject ET. 
 If one is trying to decide for oneself whether it makes sense to accept or to reject a bit 
of science, one must confront some hard questions. But these questions are not about science, 
or even about truth at all. They are about values, and in particular, they are about the values 
one wishes to endorse, to voice, to live by, to embody. Some sets of values are, in fact, 
inconsistent with acceptance of certain bits of science, while others are not. The choice 
between these values is not a matter of reason, it is simply a choice. Suppose that for Svetlana, 
say, the most important, but as yet unranked or equally ranked, values include literalism about 
the Bible and the physical well-being of her children. Call such values ‘core values.’ As it turns 
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out, Svetlana’s core values are in conflict, and because they are, there is a third possible core 
value that Svetlana may or may not hold: that of holding onto both literalism and the well-
being of her children as equally important (or unranked) core values. If she does not hold this 
third core value, then she will respond to facts, say about the role of ET in controlling disease, 
by prioritizing her two core values, thereby removing one from her core. But if she holds the 
equal-importance commitment as a core value, then the rational thing for her to do is simply 
reject the facts that generate the conflict—i.e., to deny that ET is true, and hence that it plays 
any essential role in public health or medical science. Of course, in so doing she is in fact 
undermining her ability to preserve the well-being of her children. But if she were to accept the 
facts, either this value or the value of literalism would have to be reprioritized out of the core, 
and in either case so too the equal-importance value would have to be rejected. The three 
values can only be co-satisfied if the facts are wrong—and so it is rational for her not only to 
hope they are wrong, but moreover to proceed with the full belief that they are. 
 And that is bad news for the science, because in order to accept ET she really does 
have to accept the fact that ET influences public health and medical science. For the only 
possible rational motivation for removing a value from the core, i.e., prioritizing some core 
values over others, is that there is a conflict among the core values, here between the well-
being of Svetlana’s children and literalism. In this case, if Svetlana is to rationally accept ET, 
her core values must first change, which means she must first recognize the conflict. But the 
conflict can be recognized at all only if the relevant facts are recognized! And if the facts are 
introduced in ways that explicitly or implicitly evoke the conflict, the rational choice for 
Svetlana will simply be to deny the facts.  
 How then to generate acceptance of ET, i.e., of conflict-inducing facts? A good first 
step is to introduce them in contexts where the relevant values are consistent with those facts. 
That is, by communicating the science using frames that entrain core values which are 
themselves jointly consistent with the facts being communicated. Even better if all the values 
implicit in the frame are such that effective pursuit of them demands knowledge of the truth, 
whatever it may be, because then the goal of reliable discovery of the truth from observation 
becomes instrumentally co-equal with the core values whose pursuit requires knowledge of the 
truth. In that context, science speaks with authority, and scientific inference is rational 
inference.  
5. CONCLUSION 
In lieu of a summary, we offer some lessons which follow if the above remarks are broadly 
correct. 
(1) To the extent that the facts about a particular decision context force one to reject core 
values, the rational response is to deny the facts. 
(2) Such contexts occur when scientific results force a conflict between core unprioritized 
values.  
(3) Those who deny science for these reasons do so rationally. 
(4) Such science deniers will not be swayed by more data or by efforts to improve their 
reasoning: they are in fact reasoning rationally, and will, rationally, reject new data.  
(5) Effective science communication really is a matter of values, not of facts. 
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(6) Science speaks with authority in contexts in which knowledge of the truth is 
prioritized, but has no special standing regarding the rationality of core value choices 
or prioritizations.  
(7) To speak both productively and with authority, scientists should use frames that 
appeal to core values, the effective pursuit of which requires knowledge of the truths 
being communicated.  
(8) To prevent those truths from being rejected, scientists should avoid forcing a choice 
between science and core values, or among core values. 
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